Abstract
Introduction
The term 'foreign fighters' in this article refers to fighters who involved insurgencies outside their countries. It covers not only the people who join in combat but also those who migrate and travel to the conflict zone to participate in fighting or training with an insurgent group or provide some supports (Zammit 2015) . In 1980s-1990s, people traveled from Southeast Asia and other countries to join Mujahidin in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union. They are considered as foreign fighters. It includes the people travel from all over the world to Syria and Iraq to fight against Bashar al-Asad's regime in the last decade. This article will examine transnational terrorist movements, in particular, the Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat al Nusra (JN), which impact to the rise of terrorism recruitment, transnational movements, and nationalinternational threats. Their involvement in the Syrian conflict combines violent experience, international terrorism networks, and direct threats from returnees to their home countries. The number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is varied from around 20,000 to 70,000 fighters from about 100 nationalities, including 4000 fighters from Western Europe (Lister 2015 
Foreign Fighters
Up to a thousand of Southeast Asian jihadists are among foreign fighters from all over the world. It is surprisingly the percentage of foreign fighters from the West is much higher than the participants of fighters in the history of conflict and war involving jihadists such as Afghan war. Compared to Afghan fighters, IS (used to be ISIS) is ‚much better organized in that it has a military approach in spreading its influence with an over-arching set of strategies and a strong centralized leadership. Al-Qaida has more of the attack-and-run style, and the groups affiliated with it seem to be operating relatively independent‛ (Nadaraj 2014) . The majority of recruits to the Islamic State going to Syria intended of ‚acting there rather than training to become domestic terrorists‛ and ‚remains more personal than political‛ (The Soufan Group 2015: 7). However, the latest two decades domestic attack plots were organized by individual and groups closely related to foreign fighters experience.
Bali bombings in 2002 involved Afghan veterans affiliated to Jama'ah Islamiyah. Afghan returnees endangered their home countries threatening terror attacks and violent attack plans in the US, France, Australia, Southeast Asia, Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Syrian and Iraq conflicts returnees will endanger and threaten more to their home countries.
David Malet defined foreign fighters as ‚non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts,‛ playing critical roles in conflicts since ancient periods (Lister 2015) . The nearest equivalent was fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, which attracted about 20,000 foreign fighters over a twelve years from 1980 to 1992. Charles Lister (2015) estimated foreign fighters involved in Syria and Iraq was growing dramatically from 700-1,400 in mid-2012 to over 22,000 in early 2015.
It is predicted that the number of foreign fighters: Tunisia (3,000), Saudi Arabia (2,500), Morocco (2,000), Jordan (1,500), France (1,550), Russia (1,500), Turkey (1,300), UK (700) -unnamed intelligence officials said 1,600, Germany (700), Indonesia (700), Libya (600), Bosnia (340), China (300), US (200), Malaysia (100), the Philippines (100) and Singapore (2) (Lister 2015: 1 (Parameswaran, 2015) . In addition, Malaysian Defense Force Chief, General Tan Sri Zulkifli Mohd Zin was ‚worried that when they (militants) return to Malaysia, they will do something that can threaten the safety of the country, especially after they established a network in neighbouring countries from Syria or Iraq‛ (Hanson 2015: 3) . The threats of IS to Southeast Asian countries also became a priority concern for Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean. He said that IS threats ‚not only to countries who are part of the US coalition but also to Singapore. As with the threat from the Al Qaeda, even if Singapore is not itself a target, foreign interest here may be targeted‛ (Hanson 2015: 3) .
Civil society organizations are strategic groups protecting the community from radicalization and preventing recruitments of IS. In Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, the largest Muslim organizations are the backbone for Indonesian Muslims preserving religious moderation and committed to supporting nationalism and nation-state building. They are strategic partners for National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) to counter radicalism and terrorism. 
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